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Risky Business:
A Review of Dual Class Share Structures in Canada and a
Proposal for Reform
Daniel P. Cipollone*
Introduction
The publicly traded corporation has long been a source of legal
debate and controversy. In the 21st century, however, a combination
of highly publicized corporate scandals and financial improprieties
has centered the debate surrounding publicly traded companies on
the topic of corporate governance. Corporate governance refers to the
framework by which business corporations are managed and
controlled,1 and each corporation has its own unique internal
characteristics and organization that impact the way it is governed.
One such aspect is a corporation’s equity ownership structure that
sets out the types of shares to be issued to the public, and the rights,
responsibilities, and degrees of control that each share confers on its
respective owner. This paper focuses on the contentious topic of dual
class share structures in Canada.
At their core, dual class share structures refer to a particular
corporate equity structure in which different classes of common
shares are issued, each with distinct voting and control rights.2 While
organizations like the Shareholder Association for Research and
Education (“SHARE”)3 and institutional investors like the Ontario
*Daniel Philip Cipollone, Hons BA, is a second-year JD/MBA student at Osgoode
Hall Law School and the Schulich School of Business. He is currently working as
a summer student-at-law in the Toronto office of a leading international financial
institution. He wishes to thank Andrea Bettello and the Journal’s editors for their
insightful comments and suggestions, and especially Professor Poonam Puri for
her mentorship and inspiration. Any errors, of course, are the responsibility of the
author.
1

Thomas Clarke, International Corporate Governance: A Comparative Approach
(Oxon: Routledge, 2007) at 2.
2
Dual class shares may include non-voting shares, restricted voting, and
subordinate voting shares.
3
Second Class Investors, The Use and Abuse of Subordinated Shares in Canada
(April 2004), at 5, online: SHARE: Shareholder Association for Research and
Education <www.share.ca/files/Second_Class_Investors_1.pdf> [SHARE].
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Teacher’s Pension Plan (“OTPP”)4 have argued that dual class share
structures reduce non-controlling shareholder wealth and ought to be
banned from Canadian public stock exchanges, the evidence for this
claim is less than conclusive.5 Others, particularly financial analysts,
have argued that in some instances dual class firms have exhibited
better stock market performances than even the widest held firms.
This paper aims to examine both the favourable and unfavourable
characteristics of dual class share structures, and argue that these
equity arrangements create a precarious controlling-minority
structure (“CMS”)6 that increases agency costs and financial risks to
non-controlling shareholders.
Part I of this paper provides an overview of the general structure of
public corporations and how dual class firms fundamentally differ
from other forms. In addition, a brief review of the history of dual
class share structures in Canada is provided as well as their current
relevance in Canadian capital markets. Part II examines the
arguments supporting dual class firms and the potential economic
benefits they can yield for society as a whole. While it is
acknowledged that some examples suggest that dual class firms are
an effective corporate governance structure, it is argued that these
tend to be the exception rather than the rule. Part III examines,
through the use of two models, how dual class share structures
increase the agency costs and financial risks to non-controlling
shareholders. Specifically, it is argued that as a controlling minority
shareholder’s equity in the firm decreases, agency costs for noncontrolling shareholders tend to rise at a rapid rate. Part IV
4

Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan, Shareholder Rights Issues: 4.2 Dual Class Share
Structures, online: Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan <
http://www.otpp.com/wps/wcm/connect/otpp_en/home>.
5
John L. Teall, Governance and the Market for Corporate Control (Oxon:
Routledge, 2007) at 46. “The wealth impact of dual class recapitalizations is not
clear. For example, Partch (1987) finds no evidence of shareholder wealth
reductions resulting from dual class recapitalizations. However, after expanding
the data set of Partch from 44 firms to 94 and including recapitalizations from
1984 to 1987, Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) found that shareholders experience
significant negative abnormal returns from dual class recapitalizations.”
6
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, & George G. Triantis, “Stock
Pyramids, Cross Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency
Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights” in Randall K. Morck, ed,
Concentrated Corporate Ownership (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2000) at 295.
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demonstrates how these increased agency costs and financial risks
occur. Particularly, it is argued that CMSs erode the traditional
internal and external monitoring mechanisms that serve as effective
monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms in more dispersed
ownership structures.7 Part V considers the current regulatory regime
surrounding dual class firms and argues that these limited provisions,
specifically the 1987 coat-tail provision, are largely inadequate to
manage the enhanced risks and agency costs that CMSs pose to noncontrolling shareholders. However, rather than espousing the
positions of SHARE and OTPP, Part VI of this paper proposes that
the benefits of dual class firms be harnessed under a more
appropriate regulatory regime that better mitigates the risks they pose
to non-controlling shareholders. In particular, it is argued that the
provincial implementation of a mandatory voting cap restriction is a
practical step towards improving the regulation of dual class firms
and minimizing the added agency costs they pose to non-controlling
shareholders. Part VII concludes this argument.
I. Background
To properly understand these issues, it is important to examine the
basic governance structure of a traditional public corporation and
how it differs from CMSs, as well as why dual class firms are a
relevant issue in Canadian capital markets. Public corporations, in an
effort to raise capital and expand, issue ownership shares to the
general public.8 Investors, both individual and institutional,
contribute financial capital to the firm in the hopes of realizing a
profit through the appreciation of the firm’s shares and the
distribution of dividends. Shareholders elect and delegate decisionmaking rights to a board of directors who, in turn, appoint corporate
managers responsible for the firm’s day-to-day operations.9 The
managers are accountable to the board of directors, and the directors
are accountable to the shareholders. This separation of ownership
from control gives rise to the principal-agent problem, which was
7

Dispersed ownership structures refer to firms in which no single shareholder
owns enough shares to exercise complete control over the company.
8
Tara Gry, “Dual Class Share Structures and Best Practices in Corporate
Governance” Library of Parliament (18 August 2005) at 2, online: Parliamentary
Information and research Service
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0526-e.htm>.
9
Ibid.
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famously described by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in their
book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property.10 Michael
Jensen and William Meckling further developed this concept in the
1970s in their piece Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. According to Jensen and
Meckling, directors and managers, acting as agents, often have
greater access to corporate information and wield more direct control
over the firm and, as a result, can use their positions to act in their
own self-interests rather than those of the shareholders or
principals.11 The costs borne by shareholders of managerial and
directorial indiscretion and the resources required to monitor such
actions are referred to as agency costs. As a result of the risks that
the agency problem poses to shareholders, various laws and
corporate governance mechanisms have been implemented.
Examples include the legal requirement that directors have a
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation,12 the
granting of ownership positions in the firm to management to better
align their interests with those of shareholders, and a host of financial
disclosure and reporting requirements.13 Perhaps the most important
corporate governance mechanism for influencing management
behaviour and protecting shareholder interests is a shareholder’s
right to vote. The right to vote permits shareholders to elect the board
of directors, to vote on corporate policy changes, and, in some
instances, to approve executive compensation arrangements and
appointments.14 Most corporations issue shares that each yield one
vote. Under this equity arrangement, voting rights are proportionate
to the amount of equity held in the firm, and thus the more equity
invested, the more influence an investor has on the decisions of the
corporation. However, the effectiveness of an investor’s right to vote,
which in theory is intended to offer all shareholders a degree of
control and influence on the board, is largely restricted in
corporations employing a dual class equity structure.

10

David Millon, “Theories of the Corporation” (1990) Duke LJ 201 at 214.
Ibid at 230.
12
John A. Willes & John H. Willes, Contemporary Canadian Business Law:
Principles and Cases, 8th ed (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2006) at 322.
13
Gry, supra note 8.
14
Ibid.
11
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In a dual class share structure, there are two classes of equity
securities—superior and inferior voting shares.15 The number of
votes that each share wields differs according to its class. In some
cases, superior shares carry multiple votes while inferior shares carry
only one. In other instances, superior shares carry one vote while the
inferior shares are non-voting. It is important to note that both forms
of subordinated shares are permitted to trade on the Toronto Stock
Exchange (“TSX”), Canada’s largest stock market.16 Instead of the
traditional management-shareholder agency relationship described
above and characteristic of more dispersed ownership structures,
these arrangements give rise to a unique agency relationship between
controlling minority shareholder(s) and non-controlling shareholders.
Distinct from a situation where an individual or group owns a large
share position and, in turn, an equal number of votes, dual class share
structures manipulate the typical one share to one vote ratio and
allow voting rights to exceed cash flow rights.17 These equity
structures can be created at the time of a company’s initial public
offering (“IPO”) or can be implemented later through a
recapitalization or reorganization.18 By creating multiple classes of
shares, founder(s) of corporations often keep the higher voting stocks
for themselves, decrease their equity in the firm, and sell the non or
reduced voting stock to the public in order to raise the necessary
capital. According to Professor Paul Halpern of the Rotman School
of Management at the University of Toronto, “without the dual class
structure, a firm that has significant growth opportunities would have
to issue voting equity with a resulting loss in control to the
founder(s).”19 Another motivation for the issuance of two distinct
classes of shares, according to Halpern, is to permit the founder(s) of
the company to reduce their equity investment in the firm in an effort
to diversify their own personal portfolios.20 Professors Lucian
Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, and George Triantis of Harvard Law
15

Paul J.N. Halpern, “Systemic Perspectives on Corporate Governance Systems”
in Stephen S. Cohen & Gavin Boyd, eds, Corporate Governance and
Globalization: Long Range Planning Issues (Northampton: Edward Elgar
Publishing Inc., 2000) at 32.
16
Gry, supra note 8 at 3.
17
Cash flow rights refer to claims that a shareholder has on the cash payouts of the
firm.
18
SHARE, supra note 3 at 7.
19
Halpern, supra note 15.
20
Ibid.
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School argue that this pattern of ownership creates an unstable
“controlling-minority structure because it permits a shareholder to
control a firm while holding only a fraction of its equity.”21 It is these
structures, which increase agency costs for non-controlling
shareholders and expose them to potentially exploitative behaviour
on behalf of the controlling minority shareholder, that are a fairly
common feature of Canadian capital markets.
The use of dual class shares as a corporate financing mechanism in
Canada is largely rooted in mid-19th century changes to corporate
statutes. Professors Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Poonam Puri of
Osgoode Hall Law School attribute much of these changes to the
shifting economic values of that period.22 Particularly, they claim
that the encouragement of the private initiative led to changes in
corporate legislation that “increasingly allowed corporations to vary
the one vote per share allocation through their by-laws or articles of
incorporation.”23 For example, the Ontario Joint Stock Companies’
Letters Patent Act of 1874 stated that “at all general meetings of a
corporation every shareholder was entitled to as many votes as he
owned shares in the company, unless expressly provided otherwise
by letters patent or by-laws of the corporation.”24 However, despite
legislation permitting the issuance of all types of dual class shares
between 1874 and 1953,25 their popularity in Canada did not firmly
take hold until the late 1970s.26
In 1975, only 5 per cent of companies listed on the TSX used some
form of dual class share structure.27 However, by 1987 this number
had grown to more than 15 per cent.28 According to a study
conducted by Burgundy Asset Management between December 31,
1987 and December 31, 1995, 29.2 per cent of the 413 companies
listed on the TSX had a dual class share structure.29 Randall Morck,
Jarislowsky Distinguished Professor of Finance at the University of
21

Bebchuk, supra note 6.
Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, “Dual Class Shares in Canada: A Historical
Analysis” (2006) 29 Dalhousie LJ 117 at 121.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid at 122.
25
Ibid.
26
SHARE, supra note 3 at 10.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
22
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Alberta, argues that the rise of pyramidal control (which
encompasses dual class share structures) during the final decades of
the 20th century is, in part, related to the elimination of the
Inheritance Tax in 1972.30 With shares held by estates being treated
as sales or deemed dispositions upon death for the purposes of
income tax, Morck claims that families were encouraged to maintain
perpetual control of their corporate interests so as to transfer assets to
their progeny in a virtually costless manner.31
While increasing investor opposition (particularly from institutional
investors) suggests that the use of dual class share structures in
Canada may be in decline, an estimated 25 per cent of corporations
listed on the TSX still maintain some form of dual class shares.32
Included in these statistics are some of Canada’s largest and most
renowned firms, such as Four Seasons Hotels Inc., Rogers
Communications Inc., Bombardier Inc., Telus Corp., and
Quebecor.33 Typically, a founder or their family maintains control in
each of these corporations by means of a superior voting class of
shares. For instance, the Bombardier family has only 17.5 per cent of
the equity invested in the firm, but due to its superior voting Class A
shares that each wield 10 votes, the family controls 59.7 per cent of
the firm’s total outstanding votes.34 A more extreme example is the
Stronach family of Magna International Inc., who, until recently,
controlled 66 per cent of the firm’s votes with only 0.6 per cent of
Magna’s total equity.35 With controlling minority shareholders
owning very little of the firm’s total equity, the potential exists for
these individuals and their families to exert their control in an
attempt to extract greater financial returns and private benefits. Such
benefits may include exclusive use of company resources and assets,
excessive compensation packages, and other non-pecuniary items
like prestige and status.
30

Randall Morck et al, “The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm: A History of
Canadian Corporate Ownership” in A History of Corporate Governance around
the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, November 2005) 65 at 145.
31
Ibid.
32
Gry, supra note 8 at 4.
33
SHARE, supra note 3 at 11.
34
Ibid at 12.
35
S. Khalil & M. Magnan, “Dual-Class Shares: Governance, Risks, and Rewards”
(2007, May/June), at 2, online: Ivey Business Journal
<http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/article.asp?intArticle_ID=693>.
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Furthermore, dual class share structures pose a very real concern in
Canadian capital markets, particularly for Canadian retail investors.
As recent statistics indicate, 46 per cent of the Canadian population
owns shares in publicly traded companies.36 The primary objective of
many of these investors is to fund their future financial plans and
retirement. Dual class share structures, however, do not align with
the goals of many investors because this type of structure tends to
enhance, rather than mitigate, financial risk. The byproduct of dual
class share structures is to effectively shift the burden of financial
risk towards the non-controlling shareholders while simultaneously
insulating controlling minority shareholders from loss. However,
despite the enhanced risks that CMSs pose to non-controlling
shareholders, it is important to recognize that dual class structures
are not entirely negative. The next part of this paper will consider the
arguments in favour of dual class share structures as well as some of
the benefits they can produce for investors and society as a whole.
II. Dual Class Shares: Not All Bad
There is some agreement between both proponents and critics of
CMSs that without the availability of dual class equity arrangements,
founders and entrepreneurs would be reluctant to take their firms
public due to the resulting loss in control. It is argued that this will
lead to a curtailment in the growth of new and emerging companies
who will either choose to remain private or seek less flexible forms
of financial capital, such as debt financing.37 As a result, the potential
exists for reductions in innovation, investment returns, job creation,
and overall economic growth in Canada.
In addition, some proponents of dual class share structures argue that
such arrangements are largely the result of the limits that the federal
government imposes on the level of foreign ownership of Canadian
companies.38 For instance, under section 26(1) of the federal
Broadcasting Act, which provides the Governor in Council the
discretion to issue binding directions to the Canadian Radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission (“CRTC”), the
36

Gry, supra note 8 at 2.
Ibid at 5.
38
SHARE, supra note 3 at 15.
37
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issuance and granting of broadcasting licenses has been prohibited to
governments other than the Government of Canada and to persons
who are not Canadian citizens or “eligible Canadian corporations”.39
Similarly, the Telecommunications Act and the Insurance Companies
Act, stipulate that foreign ownership limits of companies within these
industries may not exceed 20 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively.40
In accordance with these legislated limits, proponents of dual class
share structures maintain that such equity arrangements can serve as
an effective mechanism for the protection of Canadian ownership
interests in industries traditionally considered economically or
culturally sensitive.41 In pursuit of protecting national interests,
Canadian controlling minority shareholders can maintain control of
firms in these particular industries while still raising financial capital
on a global scale as “many foreign investors have happily bought
into structures of this sort.”42 It is notable, however, that the
Canadian government does not require dual class structures nor does
it even recommend such measures in the furtherance of this policy
goal.43 Rather, the federal government simply requires companies to
respect their related ownership limits. For example, Bell Canada
Enterprises is required to maintain strict foreign ownership limits but
does so with a single class of shares.44 Once a foreign investor has
surpassed this ownership threshold, Bell Canada has the authority to
force the sale of those shares in excess of that limit in order to
comply with its legislated limits.45
Lastly, proponents of dual class share structures also tout the
efficiencies of such equity arrangements by quoting powerful
39

Stikeman Elliott LLP, Broadcasting and Telecommunications: Section Q of
Stikeman Elliott’s Doing Business in Canada, online: Stikeman Elliott LLP
<http://www.stikeman.com/images/core/Q_Broadcasting_and_Telecommunication
s.pdf>. See also Broadcasting Act, SC 1991, c 11, s 26(1).
40
See Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c 38, s 16(3)-(4). See also Insurance
Companies Act, SC 1991, c 47, s 619; Investment Limits (Foreign Companies)
Regulations, SOR/92-274, s 4.
41
Barry Reiter, “Dual Class Shares: Not the Enemy” Lexpert (7 October 2010) at
1, online: Bennett Jones LLP
<http://bennettjones.com/ProjectFolder/Templates/Publications/PublicationDetail.a
spx?id=112752>.
42
Ibid.
43
SHARE, supra note 3 at 15.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
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corporate examples like Google Inc., Warren Buffett’s Berkshire
Hathaway Inc., the Blackstone Group, and Mastercard.46 In support
of these examples, it is argued that dual class share structures provide
the controlling minority shareholder with an entrenched and
protected position from corporate takeovers that allows other
shareholders to benefit from the long term value of the founder’s
vision and entrepreneurial spirit.47 However, while it is undeniable
that some of the best performing and managed companies in Canada
and the world employ dual class share structures, this does not
detract from the fact that such firms enhance potential agency costs
and financial risks to non-controlling minority shareholders. These
increased agency costs and concerns are best exemplified through a
look at the models and research conducted by Professors Bebchuk,
Kraakman, and Triantis.
III. Increased Agency Costs to Non-Controlling Shareholders
Based on the findings of their research, Bebchuk, Kraakman and
Triantis primarily argue that as cash flow rights or equity ownership
of the controlling shareholder declines, the agency costs to noncontrolling shareholders tend to rise at an alarming rate.48 They
examine this trend in two specific instances: project choice and
decisions on scope.
Project choice refers to a controller’s decision amongst various
investment options. The authors argue that in choosing between two
distinct projects, a controlling minority shareholder will typically
choose the project that produces the greatest personal return. For
instance, projects A and B will each yield a total value composed of
cash flows available to all shareholders, and private benefits
available only to the firm’s controlling minority shareholder (project
= cash flows + private benefits).49 In choosing between these
projects, the authors argue that, depending on the amount of equity
the controlling minority shareholder has invested in the firm, it is
possible that he or she may choose not to maximize total value and
instead may opt for the choice with the largest private return.
Furthermore, the authors assert that as the controller’s financial
46

Ibid.
Gry, supra note 8 at 5.
48
Bebchuk, supra note 6 at 296.
49
Ibid at 301.
47
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investment in the firm declines, the difference in total value between
each project will become less important to the controlling minority
shareholder relative to the private benefits they can extract.50 In this
sense, controlling minority shareholders are often in a position in
which they can make decisions that maximize their own personal
returns. If their cash flow rights are large, they can opt for the project
that yields the greatest value to the firm, which increases the value of
their equity investment while perhaps still yielding some personal
benefits. On the other hand, if their cash flow rights are small,
controlling minority shareholders can opt for the project with the
largest private benefits while externalizing much of the resulting
decline in share price to non-controlling shareholders, thereby
increasing overall non-controlling shareholder agency costs.
These same agency costs and wealth diverting activities can occur
when a controller decides to expand or contract the scope of a firm’s
operations. The authors explain that this can occur in two ways. First,
assume an asset confers a total value, which, similar to above, is
composed of cash flows to the firm and private benefits. If the firm
owns this asset, the controlling minority shareholder may refuse to
sell it and distribute its proceeds (likely in the form of dividends) to
non-controlling shareholders so as to maintain the private benefit.
Alternatively, if the firm does not own the asset, the controlling
minority shareholder may choose to have the company purchase it
(rather than distribute these funds via a dividend to non-controlling
shareholders or employ those funds in some use that increases
overall firm value) in order to obtain the private benefit that the asset
may yield.51 Consequently, on the basis of these models, it is evident
that the potential for private gains can distort the decisions of
controlling minority shareholders and may encourage them to utilize
the firm as a vehicle for expropriating non-controlling shareholder
wealth.
IV.I The Erosion of Internal Monitoring Mechanisms
While it can be argued that firms that issue a single class of equity
shares are also plagued by agency costs, an important distinction
between single and dual class firms lies in the effectiveness of their
50
51

Ibid at 302.
Ibid.
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internal and external monitoring mechanisms. In a single class firm,
much of the internal and external governance mechanisms remain
intact and effective, especially in highly developed capital markets
like Canada. However, in the case of a dual class firm, these internal
and external governance mechanisms are largely curtailed and any
oversight function they serve in a dispersed ownership structure is
effectively eliminated.
As indicated above, a shareholder’s right to vote is one of the most
important means of ensuring that their interests in the corporation are
heard and protected. By electing directors, introducing shareholder
proposals, and raising issues concerning corporate performance
(often at the Annual General Meeting (“AGM”)), shareholders are
responsible for monitoring the decisions of the board and
managers.52 In theory, if management is underperforming, directors
have the right to remove and replace those managers in the interests
of the corporation. Furthermore, if shareholders are dissatisfied with
the level of their representation on the board or any major decisions
of the directors, they can, at the next AGM, vote to elect new
directors.53 In this sense, shareholders, as an oversight mechanism,
serve as an important element in the overall internal governance of a
corporation.
However, in a dual class firm, non-controlling shareholders are
largely deprived from fulfilling this function as the controlling
minority position generally assumes this role. With superior and
often absolute voting power, controlling minority shareholders can
elect a plurality of the directors, dominate board decisions, and can
often run the corporation to further their own interests.54 For
example, according to Robert Bertram, former Executive Vice
President of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board, “there are
only two or three people on the Magna board who could be
considered independent of Frank Stronach.”55 Though some may
argue that a controlling position can act as a more effective
52

Erik Banks, Corporate Governance: Financial Responsibility, Controls and
Ethics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004) at 282.
53
Willes, supra note 12 at 328-329.
54
Bernard Simon, “Many Shares, Little Power for Change” The New York Times
(8 May 2003), <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/08/business/many-shares-littlepower-for-change.html> [Simon].
55
Ibid.
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monitoring mechanism than other more dispersed ownership
structures (similar to the role that financial institutions serve in the
co-determination corporate governance models common in
Germany),56 there is a lack of internal mechanisms that can in turn
monitor the controlling minority shareholder. With voting power no
longer tied to equity, even large institutional investors cannot
monitor or counterbalance the influence, activities, and interests of
controlling minority shareholders.
Moreover, in a 1999 study of the ownership structures of the 20
largest firms in the 27 wealthiest economies, Professors Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer find that in 69
per cent of cases,57 individuals and families that control firms are
also involved on the board and management, serving as either the
Chairman or Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), or both.58 The
authors also state that this data does not include those instances
where an individual who has married into the family is serving in
either a board or management position, as they typically do not have
the same last name and therefore were not identified by the study. In
Canada, due to the voting influence that controlling minority
shareholders typically wield, they can influence decisions on the
election and appointment of corporate directors and officers. In many
cases, controlling minority shareholders or their family members
have and, in some instances, continue to serve as Chairman, CEO, or
both. For instance, Peter Munk, founder of Barrick Gold
Corporation, who is also the firm’s controlling minority shareholder
by means of a dual class share structure, has, at times, served as
either the Chairman or CEO, or both.59 In the case of Bombardier
Inc., Laurent Beaudoin, who is the son-in-law of company founder
Joseph-Armand Bombardier, served as both the firm’s Chairman and
CEO from 1979 to 1999.60 Perhaps the most notable example of this
56

John W . Cioffi, “Adversarialism versus legalism: Juridification and litigation in
corporate governance reform,” (2009) 3 Regulation & Governance 235 at 241.
57
Rafael La Porta is the Nobel Foundation Professor of Finance at the Tuck School
of Business at Dartmouth. Florencio Lopez de Silanes is a Professor of business
and economics at EDHEC Grande Ecole in France. Andrei Shleifer is a Professor
of economics at Harvard University.
58
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate
Ownership Around the World” (1999) 54: 2 The Journal of The American Finance
Association at 496.
59
Ibid, at Appendix 2.
60
SHARE, supra note 3 at 12.
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is Conrad Black of the Canadian company Hollinger Inc., which
served as the holding company of Hollinger International and a
myriad of media and newspaper companies. Black was accused and
convicted of expropriating more than $400 million from the firm
through his roles as Chairman, CEO, and controlling minority
shareholder.61 Though it would be overly presumptuous to claim that
in all instances where controlling minority shareholders are involved
in both board and management positions corporate abuses and
improprieties will necessarily arise, it is reasonable to suggest that, at
the very least, the risk of conflicts of interest are enhanced. Halpern
argues that the controlling minority shareholder acting in these roles
“maintains the power to include or exclude any shareholder
proposals” that are raised at the AGM, and can dictate the majority
of corporate decisions regardless of other shareholder approval.62
Consequently, while controlling minority shareholders may be in an
advantaged position to monitor management and directors, the fact
that they are often managers and directors themselves largely erodes
the internal monitoring function of the board, and increases their
propensity for appropriating non-controlling shareholder wealth. In
this sense, the fact that controlling minority shareholders are often
involved at both the board and management levels increases the
potential for conflicts of interest to arise, particularly in “non-arms
length” transactions, and ultimately ends up suppressing the internal
supervisory function of the board.63
IV.II The Erosion of External Monitoring Mechanisms
Though it is evident that in a controlled corporate structure many of
the internal monitoring mechanisms are extinguished, there are also
external mechanisms that can work to discipline majority equity
holders and management. Specifically, the two primary external
disciplinary mechanisms are the securities market and the market for
61

Frank Ahrens & Peter Slevin, “Conrad Black, 3 Others Indicted: US Says They
Looted Parent of Chicago Sun-Times” The Washington Post (18 November 2005)
at para 11, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/17/AR2005111700910_pf.html>.
62
Halpern, supra note 15 at 9.
63
Yvan Allaire, “Dual-Class Shares in Canada: Some Modest Proposals”, online:
(November 2006) at 6. Social Science Research Network:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=952043> .
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corporate control. However, while these mechanisms prove highly
effective in cases of dispersed ownership structures and controlled
firms where control is achieved through a majority equity stake, the
effectiveness of these mechanisms is largely stifled in cases of dual
class share structures.
In the securities market, a firm’s share value generally serves as an
indication of its overall performance. Accordingly, the securities
market signals the success of a company by rewarding it with a
higher share price, or signals poorer results with a lower share price.
In the case of a firm with dispersed ownership, prolonged
underperformance will translate into shareholder dissatisfaction. And
through investor pressure and voting rights, underperforming
directors and management will, in theory, be removed.64 In a firm
with concentrated holdings, where control is achieved through a
majority equity position, the securities market can discipline
management, directors, and even the controlling shareholder as they
must internalize much of the costs experienced by market declines.
Consequently, it is in the best interest of the controlling shareholder
to pressure management and directors to improve share price and not
to engage in any wealth diverting activities. In turn, this will increase
the value of the firm and produce a financial benefit for all
shareholders. Conversely, the discipline of the securities market is
highly ineffective against dual class firms.
The effectiveness of the securities market is further inhibited by the
illiquidity of superior voting shares.65 While inferior voting shares
can be bought and sold readily on public stock exchanges, superior
shares are often in limited supply and in a lot of cases do not even
trade at all.66 As a consequence, they are less susceptible to market
fluctuations and work to protect the value of the controlling minority
shareholder’s equity. This insulated position from the securities
markets can, in turn, lead to a misalignment of interests between the
controlling and non-controlling shareholders. For instance, in 2003
the Bombardier family was offered a $1 billion dollar investment
from the OTPP in return for giving up its dual class share structure.67
At the time, the investment would have helped the struggling
64

Halpern, supra note 15 at 27.
Gry, supra note 8 at 3.
66
Ibid.
67
SHARE, supra note 3 at 12.
65

Vol. 21

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

77

company with its highly leveraged balance sheet by allowing it to
reduce some of the capital costs associated with its loans.68 However,
the Bombardier family, rather than improving the corporation’s
financial situation, sought to maintain control of the firm and refused
the offer. Subsequently, the firm resorted to issuing $1.2 billion of its
subordinated voting shares at a price just above its 52-week trading
low.69 In effect, while the existing holders of the subordinated stock
suffered a dilution70 and the company “paid a higher price for the
new capital than it should have…Bombardier was able to remain in
Bombardier hands.”71 This example illustrates that the desire of
controlling minority shareholders to maintain their position within a
firm can work to override the influence that the securities market can
have on their decision-making. If, at the time of the OTPP offer, the
Bombardier family had a larger equity stake in the firm or, at the
very least, if its equity was not so insulated from the securities
market, it is more likely that the firm would have made the more
rational and cost efficient choice of accepting OTPP’s offer. These
types of actions and choices are further enhanced by the entrenched
and insulated position that controlling minority shareholders have
against the market for corporate control.
Generally, the market for corporate control refers to corporate
takeover bids and the transfer of ownership and control of publicly
traded companies. Primarily facilitated by the securities market, it
functions best in instances of firms with highly dispersed
ownership.72 Halpern argues that in such firms underperformance
often produces a lower stock price, which in turn attracts potential
acquirers who believe they can expand the performance of the firm
by either removing management, achieving economies of scale, or
increasing market share.73 In this way, the theoretical threat of
replacement encourages management to maximize corporate
performance and shareholder returns.
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However, as with the securities market, this situation is much
different in cases of controlled or dual class firms. Firstly, if
controlling minority shareholders make poor corporate decisions and
the value of the firm’s shares decline, then the market for corporate
control will not work to discipline these actions. Though securities
markets will produce a lower share price to reflect
underperformance, “the lower price is not a signal for a takeover but
is just a cost to the non-controlling shareholders.”74 As previously
mentioned, this reduction in share value will have a negligible
impact on the limited and insulated shareholdings of the controlling
minority shareholder, and it is unlikely to affect their ability to
continue extracting private benefits. Moreover, even if the share
price of the dual class firm declines to the point where there are
potential acquirers, the absolute control that the controlling
shareholder wields over the firm’s votes allows them to effectively
quash any attempts to allow the acquisition to proceed.
Secondly, in order for a takeover bid to be successful, the target
company’s board of directors must determine that it is in the best
interests of all shareholders and must approve the sale. Controlling
minority shareholders seeking to maintain control will often be
disinclined to accept such a bid and relinquish their position. Though
Halpern argues that the board may still be deeply concerned with the
interests of non-controlling shareholders, he also claims that the
board will realize that the superior-voting shareholder has ultimate
control and is thus unlikely to counter or oppose his or her
interests.75 According to a report compiled by the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, Conrad Black, through his
controlling minority position in Hollinger Inc., routinely appointed
the majority of board members who “were unlikely or unwilling to
oppose his authority.”76 As such, the controlling minority
shareholders’ special voting privileges allow them to control or
heavily influence the board to prevent a takeover threat and
ultimately remain in control of the firm.
Lastly, prior to the TSX’s imposition of the non-retroactive coat-tail
74

Ibid, at 28.
Ibid at 29.
76
Gry, supra note 8 at 6.
75

Vol. 21

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

79

provision in 1987, controlling minority shareholders could sell their
controlling positions at a premium77 while no equivalent offer or
purchase had to be made for the company’s inferior voting shares. In
this case, the controlling minority shareholder could simply sell
control of the firm to a potential acquirer willing to pay such a
premium.78 As such, in the event of a takeover, controlling minority
shareholders were (and to a large extent still are) able to extract large
financial premiums while excluding the interests of non-controlling
shareholders.79 In addition, in the event that the sale of the
controlling position proceeds, the acquirer simply assumes the
controlling position in the firm, subjecting non-controlling
shareholders to perpetual controlled ownership. This entrenchment of
the controlling position in dual class firms adds to the weakened
position of non-controlling shareholders and increases their
vulnerability to potentially exorbitant agency costs and financial
risks.
V. Regulatory Response – Good, but not Good Enough
Despite the concerns and issues surrounding dual class share
structures discussed above, Canadian provincial regulators and
public stock exchanges have imposed very limited regulations and
requirements on these types of equity ownership arrangements. In
particular, the Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”) requires
holders of inferior voting shares to receive the same information that
holders of superior shares are entitled to, and calls for dual class
firms to provide inferior voting shareholders with the right to attend
shareholder meetings.80 In addition, the OSC requires that any
“reorganizations or reclassifications of common shares into restricted
voting shares must have the approval of the majority of the minority
shareholders.”81 Perhaps the most significant restriction imposed on
dual class share structures in Canada is the previously mentioned
77
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provision implemented by the TSX that requires reporting issuers to
provide coat-tail protections to non-controlling shareholders.82 Coattail provisions require companies issuing superior voting shares to
ensure that any offer made to purchase the firm’s superior voting
shares must be accompanied by a concurrent offer at the same terms
and conditions to the other inferior classes of shareholders.83 This
provision eliminates a key source of private benefits for controlling
minority shareholders, namely, “the possibility for a controlling
shareholder to sell the control of the company and pocket the large
premium that usually comes with control, while all other
shareholders would receive no benefit from the transaction.”84
Several studies conducted on dual class firms in Canada have
concluded that as a result of the coat-tail protections, Canadian
superior voting shares trade at some of the smallest premiums in the
world.85 According to a study by Brian F. Smith and Ben AmoakaAdu, Professors of Finance and Economics at Wilfrid Laurier
University, the median premium for superior shares of Canadian
companies between 1988 and 1992 was 6.37 per cent.86 Tatiana
Nenova, a Harvard Researcher currently at the World Bank,
conducted studies on superior share premiums in 2000 and 2003 and
estimates that the control premium in Canada ranges between 2 per
cent and 4 per cent.87 Though the data collected largely confirms the
conclusion that the coat-tail provision instituted by the TSX has
successfully curbed the ability of controlling minority shareholders
to extract premiums in the event of a sale, two problems still plague
the effectiveness of the coat-tail provision. The first pertains to a
loophole in the coat-tail protection that allows controlling minority
shareholders to extract a premium when selling their controlling
interest. The second refers to the fact that the TSX failed to provide
the coat-tail provision with a retroactive status.
Under the first scenario, a controlling minority shareholder may sell
their interest in the firm at a premium, so long as the interest is sold
82
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to multiple parties and each party, on their own, is unable to exercise
absolute control.88 This form of transaction does not trigger the coattail provision as control is only achieved through joint and
coordinated action. For example, in 1994, after the death of Frank
Griffiths Sr., founder of WIC Western International Communications
Ltd., his wife, Emily Griffiths, sold all her superior voting shares at a
significant premium over the subordinated shares she sold at the
same time.89 Though the company had a coat-tail provision in place
that ought to have provided non-controlling shareholders with the
option to sell their shares at the same premium, because the sale of
the superior shares was to Rogers Communications, Shaw Cable and
CanWest Inc., each of which were unable to garner absolute control
individually, the coat-tail provision was not triggered.90
Consequently, by selling her controlling interest to multiple parties,
Mrs. Griffiths was able to escape the scope of the coat-tail and earn a
premium on her controlling shares with no equivalent offer made to
the non-controlling shareholders.
The coat-tail provision’s lack of a retroactive status also limits its
effectiveness in mitigating against the increased agency costs and
risks associated with dual class firms. Consequently, a significant
number of companies that listed their superior voting shares prior to
1987 have been able to operate and trade absent a coat-tail provision.
Currently, 13 of the 96 dual class firms listed on the TSX are
permitted to trade without a coat-tail provision.91 One of these firms
in particular, Magna International Inc., which created its multiple
voting class share structure in 1978,92 has been the recent source of
immense controversy and debate.
In March 2010, Frank Stronach was asked by Magna’s management
if he would be willing to abandon Magna’s dual class share structure
and, by extension, his controlling minority position in the firm.93
Following a month of discussions, Magna’s management informed
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its board (“the Board”) of the potential offer to purchase Stronach’s
controlling superior Class B shares. The Board subsequently
established a special committee of independent directors of Magna to
review, consider and negotiate with Stronach over the proposed
purchase.94 The Stronach Trust, which is owned by Stronach and his
family and is the actual legal owner of Magna’s superior voting
Class B shares, agreed that it would “sell its Class B shares to
Magna…at a premium of some 1800 per cent over Magna’s Class A
shares.95 In addition, Stronach would receive a five-year consulting
contract and equity and voting interests in an electric car partnership
between Magna and Stronach Trust.”96
While the Board retained CIBC to conduct the valuation and act as
its financial advisor, CIBC was unable to provide a fairness opinion
because the dilution associated with the transaction was
unprecedented.97 At the announcement of the proposal, there was
much debate among shareholder advisory groups and institutional
investors. RiskMetrics Group Inc, a risk advisory firm, advised its
clients holding Magna’s Class A shares to support the proposal
because of the potential future benefits of the one share, one vote
structure, including: elimination of the Stronach discount,98
improved corporate accountability, and the removal of the
impediment to future takeover threats.99 Glass Lewis & Co., a proxy
advisor and wholly owned subsidiary of the Ontario Teacher’s
Pension Plan (“OTPP”), on the other hand, strongly urged its clients
to vote against the deal.100 Particularly, the OTPP “was concerned
94
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that Stronach was being permitted to extract outrageous premiums
from Magna under the guise of normalizing its governance
structure.”101 The debates surrounding this proposal continued for
several months and eventually culminated in a hearing at the OSC.
Though several issues were considered by the OSC, it primarily
focused on whether “the proposed transaction was abusive and
should the Commission restrain it in the public interest?”102
Impeding the arguments of those opposed and seeking to have the
transaction barred by the OSC was the fact that Magna did not have a
coat-tail provision in place. Moreover, because the deal was not a
third party bid to acquire control but rather the company itself
effectively paying to release control into the market, the coat-tail
would not have applied. According to Professor Edward Waitzer,
Former Chair of the OSC, if a coat-tail would have been in place,
those opposed to the transaction would have argued that the policy
concerns underpinning coat-tail provisions should have been invoked
similar to the OSC ruling in Re Canadian Tire (1987).103 In Re
Canadian Tire, the third party bidder sought to avoid and exploit the
corporation’s coat-tail provision by purchasing only 49 per cent of
the firm’s outstanding common voting shares.104 While the coat-tail
was not triggered by the proposed transaction, the OSC intervened
and ordered a cease trade order because the deal was “contrived to
circumvent the coattail, and thus frustrate the intention of its wellintentioned proponents.”105 In the case of the Magna transaction, the
fact that no coat-tail provision was in place limited the ability of
those opposed to the transaction to ground such an argument and to
urge the OSC to invoke similar reasoning in prohibiting the
transaction from proceeding. Ultimately, given the circumstances,
the OSC held that Magna’s shareholders would best determine the
deal’s fairness so long as they were provided with adequate
disclosure in order to understand their interests and the ramifications
101
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of their decision. On July 23, Magna’s Class A shareholders voted
75.3 per cent in favour of the proposal.106
The overwhelming shareholder support for the recapitalization can
be cast in two distinct lights. On one hand, it may be interpreted as a
clear signal that the non-controlling shareholders of Magna were of
the opinion that the premium the Stronach Trust was able to extract
was reasonable and fair. On the other hand, however, the
overwhelming support for the recapitalization may suggest that noncontrolling shareholders were dissatisfied with Frank Stronach
continuously imposing his will on the firm and, as a result, were
willing to pay a premium in order to remove his entrenched position.
However, regardless of the reasons supporting the transaction’s
approval, it is a deal that has remained largely criticized as a gross
abuse and exploitation of non-controlling shareholders and Canadian
capital markets. According to Anita Anand, a University of Toronto
Law Professor and Chair of the OSC’s Investor Advisory Panel, the
incredibly constrained choice that shareholders were presented with
is indicative of “the power of the despot.”107 At the deal’s close, it
was estimated that Mr. Stronach obtained more than US$863 million
from Magna International Inc. for abolishing Stronach Trust’s Class
B superior voting shares.108 In addition, given that part of this payout
was in the form of 9 million common Class A shares, non-controlling
shareholders suffered a stock dilution of approximately 11.4 per cent,
a rate considered off the charts by most investment banks, as typical
dilutions range between 1 and 4 per cent.109 For Anand, the Magna
recapitalization carries important precedential value and implications
for capital markets as a whole. Specifically, she states that “after
Magna, the greater the private benefits of control, the higher the
premium that will be paid to extricate firms from [their] controlling
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shareholders.”110 Furthermore, in opposition to those who have
argued that Magna’s non-controlling shareholders were offered the
opportunity to vote on the recapitalization, Jeffrey MacIntosh,
Toronto Stock Exchange Chair at the University of Toronto Faculty
of Law, has argued that “claiming a shareholder vote…says nothing
about whether the transaction is fair.”111 Specifically, he maintains
that “while Magna ticked all the applicable boxes, the transaction
[violated] many of the fundamental underpinnings of contemporary
corporate and securities law.”112 Lastly, the OSC, despite approving
Magna’s recapitalization, recently released the reasons to its decision
and characterized several aspects of the deal as “fundamentally
flawed.”113
The coat-tail provision’s lack of a retroactive status, therefore, erodes
its effectiveness and permits controlling minority shareholders of
dual class share structures pre-dating 1987 to extract large premiums
in exchange for relinquishing their control. Furthermore, with 13
major dual class firms currently listed on the TSX operating without
a coat-tail provision, each of the controlling minority shareholders of
these firms could legally sell their controlling interest for a
significant premium, without any equivalent offer being made to the
non-controlling shareholders of the firm. Thus, while the
implementation of the coat-tail provision was an important measure
instituted by the TSX to curb the extraction of such premiums, it is a
measure that remains susceptible to abuse and exploitation in
Canadian capital markets.
VI. Recommendation for Reform
On the basis of the above analysis, it is clear that the equity structure
of dual class firms enhances many of the concerns and risks of more
traditional corporate ownership models. It is also evident, despite the
110
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efforts of the OSC and TSX, that the current regulatory regime is
inadequate to deal with these enhanced governance concerns.
However, with dual class firms producing superior returns for their
controlling shareholders, whether in the form of private benefits or
cash flow, any proposals that work to limit these gains are going to
be met with significant opposition and resistance. Thus, in seeking to
introduce new mechanisms that improve the governance of these
firms, a balance must be struck that improves accountability to noncontrolling shareholders without completely alienating the interests
of current controlling minority shareholders. It is in this sense that
the proposal for introducing a retroactive voting cap provision is
endorsed, as it represents a highly practical and effective means of
enhancing the overall governance of CMSs.
A voting cap, in its most fundamental sense, involves limiting the
ratio of votes between superior and inferior shares. As such, instead
of allowing entrepreneurs and founders the freedom to attribute any
concentration of voting rights to their particular class of controlling
shares, there ought to be retroactive legislated restrictions on these
rights. For instance, returning to the case of Magna International Inc.,
where Frank Stronach’s Class B shares carried 500 votes while Class
A shares only wielded 1 vote, a legislated cap would prevent such
disproportionate voting power and influence.114 Under the proposed
voting cap, superior shares would be restricted to a maximum
number of votes, some suggest between 4 and 10 votes, while
inferior shares, in most cases, would yield 1.115 Consequently, in
order for controlling minority shareholders to exercise control over a
company, they would have to significantly increase their equity in
the firm. Though it is not yet certain what specific ratio should be
constructed or introduced, what is important is how this proposal will
improve the monitoring function of both the securities market and
the market for corporate control.
In order for this proposal to yield meaningful improvements in the
governance of dual class firms, it is important that it include a
retroactive status. Drawing on much of the failure and criticism
surrounding the coat-tail provision (most of which is directed at its
lack of a retroactive clause) it appears that such a condition would
114
115

Simon, supra note 54.
Allaire, supra note 63 at 23.

Vol. 21

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

87

provide important strength and support to the implementation of a
voting cap in Canada. With an estimated 25 per cent of companies
traded on the TSX utilizing multiple class shares, it is crucial that
none of these firms be able to escape the proposed voting cap clause
on the basis of non-retroactivity. This is further supported by the
previously mentioned fact that at least 13 major dual class companies
on the TSX continue to operate unaffected by the coat-tail provision.
Thus, by reflecting on the flaws of the coat-tail provision, it is easy
to rationalize the inclusion of a retroactive status for the voting cap
proposal, as it should ensure that all dual class firms, regardless of
their public listing date, comply with the proposed legislated voting
restriction. Moreover, by ensuring greater adherence to this
restriction, the retroactive clause will simultaneously help to improve
the monitoring function of the securities market and the market for
corporate control in relation to dual class firms.
In combination with the proposed retroactive voting cap restriction, it
is recommended that all Canadian dual class firms be required to
eliminate their non-voting equity. In cases where firms currently
offer non-voting stock to the public, these shares should be converted
such that they yield at least one vote. The rationale supporting this
recommendation is two-pronged. Firstly, the elimination of nonvoting stock would provide each shareholder, regardless of equity
held, a degree of influence on the firm. Though in many cases this
influence would be negligible, in the event that non-controlling
shareholders were to coordinate their efforts, their ability to vote
would serve as a tremendous advantage, especially in challenging
proposals or actions by the controlling minority shareholder.
Secondly, granting each shareholder a right to vote will eliminate the
ability of dual class firms to exercise a potential loophole in the
proposed voting cap. For example, if a firm was to adopt the voting
cap restriction absent a provision for eliminating non-voting stock, it
could, in theory, comply with the cap yet retain a sub-set class of
non-voting stock/shareholders. Though the controlling minority
shareholder would have fewer votes as a result of the cap, they
would still maintain absolute voting power over the class of noncontrolling shareholders holding shares with no voting rights.
Moreover, the non-voting shareholders would not be able to exercise
any influence over the firm. Consequently, by counteracting the
voting cap, controlling minority shareholders would still be able to
exercise complete control over the firm while other shareholders
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would wield little to no influence. Thus, in order for the proposed
voting cap to be successful, it is essential that dual class firms also
eliminate any of their non-voting stock.
While the mechanics of the voting cap and its need for retroactive
status are important, greater in significance and more central to this
analysis is how these instruments will improve the monitoring and
disciplinary functions of the securities market and the market for
corporate control. Central to the voting cap proposal is the
manipulation of voting rights, which will alter typical CMS
ownership arrangements so that they more closely resemble a
controlled corporate structure (“CCS”) where control is achieved
through a majority equity position. By restricting the number of
votes that superior shares wield, the voting power exercised by the
controlling position is effectively diluted. Though the controlling
minority shareholder may still be able to acquire more than 50 per
cent of the corporation’s total votes, the only means in which to
achieve such control is by simultaneously increasing their equity
ownership and financial risk in the firm. Consequently, any risk
taking, moral hazard, or diversionary activity that may produce a
private benefit to the controlling shareholder, which generally results
in a lower share price, also produces a significant cost to the equity
they hold in the firm. Similar in effect to a CCS, the increased capital
invested in the firm forces the controlling minority shareholder to
bear more of the costs of their non-wealth maximizing behaviour.
Thus, by aligning the controlling minority shareholders interests
more closely to the firm’s overall value and the interests of other
non-controlling shareholders, a voting cap provides a disincentive for
them to extract private benefits and in turn mitigates against noncontrolling shareholder exploitation and agency costs. It is this
important equity requirement for exercising corporate control that
will improve the functioning of the securities market in disciplining
dual class firms and their controlling shareholders.
Though a voting cap will undeniably improve the monitoring
mechanism of the securities market, its imposition will not, however,
guarantee the same degree of success in terms of the market for
corporate control. The market for corporate control is most efficient
when firms are widely held. The presence of a controlling position,
whether a controlling minority shareholder or a controlling
shareholder who has achieved control through equity, diminishes this
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monitoring function. However, while a controlling minority
shareholder is effectively entrenched and insulated from a takeover
threat, a controlling shareholder in a CCS is somewhat more
susceptible to takeovers. Thus, a voting cap that allows a CMS to
function more like a CCS in takeover situations represents a modest
improvement for the overall governance of the corporation and
accountability to non-controlling shareholders. Moreover, beyond
facilitating a more efficient market for corporate control, the dilution
of the controlling minority shareholder’s voting power should
improve the overall investment appeal of dual class firms and
encourage greater institutional ownership and investment, a group
that has traditionally opposed such structures. This may render the
controlling position more susceptible to proxy contests and
takeovers, and may lead to the creation of several large block
investment holdings in the firm, similar to the co-determinant
German and Japanese governance models.116 In turn, this may result
in greater corporate oversight and a governance system with a
broader set of checks and balances, as the interests of each block
would be posited against the others.
Moreover, with SHARE working with various pension funds in
Canada to help promote greater shareholder activism, the
introduction of a voting cap could help to support these important
efforts.117 In turn, this could provide non-controlling shareholders of
dual class firms with a superior means in which to raise proposals for
change and encourage their participation at annual general meetings.
Thus, utilizing a voting cap to dilute the voting concentration of a
controlling minority shareholder may work to encourage corporate
takeovers, increase institutional investments, correct the power
imbalances associated with dual class firms, and generally result in a
better corporate governance model that mitigates against the
enhanced agency costs and risks to non-controlling shareholders.
VII. Conclusion
While there are some undeniable benefits associated with dual class
firms and many, in fact, have produced financial returns similar to, or
better than, more dispersed ownership structures, this does not
116
117

Cioffi, supra note 56.
SHARE, supra note 3 at 1, 18.

Vol. 21

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

90

detract from the fact that these ownership structures significantly
augment agency costs and financial risks for non-controlling
shareholders. By manipulating typical corporate voting
arrangements, dual class firms firmly concentrate control in the
hands of a limited number of shareholders, threaten effective
corporate governance practices, and violate the ability of noncontrolling minority shareholders to effectively influence corporate
decision making.
It has been argued that these adverse effects are primarily facilitated
by the fact that the structure of dual class firms effectively erodes the
traditionally successful internal and external corporate monitoring
mechanisms. Though some, albeit limited, regulatory attempts have
been made to curb the adverse implications dual class firms can have
on non-controlling shareholder interests, these attempts have been
largely ineffective in their aim. However, rather than banning these
firms from Canadian capital markets, it has been argued that the
provincial implementation of a mandatory retroactive voting cap
restriction may serve as a practical and effective attempt to harness
the benefits associated with dual class firms while mitigating their
risks and improving their overall governance.
Particularly noteworthy in Canada is the recent dual class share
recapitalization of MI Developments Inc (“MI”), a firm also
controlled by Frank Stronach and spun out of Magna International
Inc. in 2003.118 The proposal to eliminate MI Developments’ dual
class share structure was approved by its shareholders at its AGM on
March 29, 2011 and was subsequently approved by the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice on June 30.119 The recapitalization, similar
to that in Magna, was made by way of a plan of arrangement under
the Ontario Business Corporations Act. According to Blair Franklin
Capital Partners, which conducted the valuation of MI’s
recapitalization, the transfer of assets to Stronach upon the
cancellation of his controlling superior shares was “outside of the
118

MI Developments Inc, News Release, “MI Developments Enters in Agreements
For Shareholders to Consider Elimination of its Dual Class Share Structure” (31
January 2011) online: <http://www.midevelopments.com/uploads/File/PR/PressRelease-Dated-Feb-1--2011.pdf>.
119
Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, MI Developments Eliminates its Dual Class Share
Structure, online: BLG < http://www.blg.com/en/mediacentre/Pages/dealSuits_303.aspx>.

Vol. 21

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

91

range of the consideration paid for comparable transactions relating
to the collapse of a dual class share structure.”120 However, despite
Blair Franklin’s formal valuation of Stronach’s Class B superior
voting shares of US$50 per share, the final transaction translated into
a final per share value somewhere between US$1,610 and US$2,009
for Stronach’s controlling interest.121 Apart from this significant
premium for ceding control of the firm, Blair Franklin estimates the
resulting dilution to the subordinate Class A shareholders at
approximately 31 per cent.122 This ruling, together with the decision
in Magna, underscores the relevance and ongoing concern of dual
class share structures in Canada. Furthermore, these cases shed light
on the deference that decision makers afford to shareholder approval
in such transactions, and presents an important avenue for further
research and investigation into the recapitalization of dual class firms
in Canada.
Clearly, despite growing opposition, dual class share structures are,
and will likely remain, a prominent and contemporary concern in
Canadian capital markets. As a result, it is incumbent upon
regulatory organizations, academics, legal and investment
practitioners, and investors in general, to engage in further research,
investigation, and critical debate into dual class share structures and
the enhanced risks they pose to non-controlling shareholders.
Ultimately, the question that must centre the debate is how the
governance of dual class firms in Canada can be improved so as to
mitigate their associated risks while still maintaining their inherent
efficiencies and benefits.
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Appendix I
Date

Company

May 2010
May 2006
March 2006
Dec. 2005
Sept. 2005
March 2005
Feb. 2004
Feb. 2004
Dec. 2003

Magna proposal
Extendicare
Canam Group
CoolBrands
ProMetic Life Sci.
Diaz Resources
MDC Partners
Gildan
Sherritt

% Share
Dilution
11.41
1.28
3.04
0
0
0
0
0
0

Source: Greg Keenan, Jeff Gray & Andrew Willis, “Stronach, the
Fighter, takes the Magna Deal Controversy in Stride” The Globe and
Mail (18 June, 2010), online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.globeadvisor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/story/gam/20100
618/FINALMAGNAOSC18ATL>.
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